We have elsewhere reviewed proposals to reform terminology and improve interpretations of conventional statistics by emphasizing logical and information concepts over probability concepts. We here give detailed reasons and methods for reinterpreting statistics (including but not limited to) P-values and interval estimates in unconditional terms, which describe compatibility of observations with an entire set of analysis assumptions, rather than just a narrow target hypothesis.
pregnancy, and psychiatric emergency department visit during pregnancy.
The paper then presented an analysis with adjustment based on a high-dimensional propensity score (HDPS), in which the estimated hazard ratio became 1.61 with a 95% CI spanning 0.997 to 2.59. Despite the estimated 61% increase in the hazard rate in the exposed children and an interval estimate including ratios as large as 2.59 and no lower than 0.997, the authors still declared that there was no association between in utero serotonergic antidepressant exposure and ASD because it was not "statistically significant." This was a misinterpretation of their own results, insofar as an association was indeed present [8, 9] and quite close to the 70% increase they reported from other studies [10] .
In what follows, we will explain the logic underpinning correct descriptions of these results, such as, "After HDPS adjustment for confounding, a 61% hazard elevation remained; however, under the same model, every hypothesis from no elevation up to a 160% hazard increase had p ≥ 0.05; Thus, while quite imprecise, these results are most consistent with previous observations of a positive association between antidepressant exposure and subsequent ASD (although the association may be partially or wholly due to uncontrolled biases)."
| DECONDITIONING BY EXPLICATION OF ALTERNATIVE CAUSES OF OBSERVATIONS
As is well known, the presence of an association in multiple observational studies does not by itself mean the drugs under study cause autism. In fact, the authors argued that the associations seen in their initial results [7, 10] repre- The statistical adjustments used by Brown et al. [7, 10] were in fact designed to minimize confounding, and thus in traditional interpretations. This information limitation of statistical analyses is inherent and universal; a notable example is the report of faster-than-light neutrinos which turned out to be due to equipment defects [14] .
In parallel, if we observe a large P-value and thus a small S-value, we cannot conclude that there is no violation of any assumption; quite contrarily, it may be that the assumption violations biased the P-value upward instead of downward. This caution is just the unconditional version of the warning dating back to Pearson [15] and often repeated since [16] [17] [18] [19] , that a large P-value is not evidence that the test hypothesis is correct. As reflected by the small S-value, it simply means the test supplied little information against the test hypothesis or any other assumption used to compute the P-value. This lack of information reflects only the limitations of the test (which in turn may reflect limitations of the study), not the absence of an effect.
| THE NECESSITY OF UNCONDITIONAL INTERPRETATIONS
The conditional and unconditional interpretations are con- The unconditional interpretation is usually far more appropriate in health and medical sciences, where researchers rarely achieve full control of all potential sources of systematic error (even randomized trials will suffer from drop-out, censoring and related problems that may create bias). In contrast, in many "hard science" experiments researchers may control all important conditions and thus justify a conditional interpretation -but again, serious exceptions occur even in particle physics [14] .
We view explication of the conditional vs. unconditional distinction as crucial to good teaching, and the unconditional view as essential for good practice: When (as usual in our experience) there is meaningful doubt about the assumptions underlying a statistical procedure, we need to remind ourselves of the unconditional fact that any result ("large" or "small") may have occurred not only from "chance" but also from assumption violations. Such reminders are seen in well-reported studies, which list and caution about possible sources of bias in the study. We thus hold that unconditional interpretations need to be covered whenever any reasonable doubt can be raised about background assumptions.
The unconditional interpretation is far more helpful than the conditional when there are concerns about violations of assumptions used by the latter. Suppose for example there are plausible concerns about violations of the data collection, processing, or reporting protocols. A common concern is that a P-value was selected for special emphasis out of several based on its size (whether for being high, "downward hacking"; or low, "upward hacking") or a CI was selected from several based on including or exclud- planations needs to contain any causal mechanism whose possibility is seen to be near or exceed that of "chance" (the hypothesis that all the causal effects producing the data from the tested model were blocked by conditioning on the model) [20] . In typical social and biomedical applications, there will be multiple such explanations, and they will not be mutually exclusive; for example, an explanation for a temporally directed association will include direct causation, bias, random error, and every combination of the three that produces what was observed.
The multiple explanations allowed by the unconditional view show why it would be an inversion fallacy to say that an S-value measures the information supporting or favoring an alternative hypothesis. Considering the example, it would be wrong to say the S-value of 4.31 against the no-effect hypothesis (that the drug does not affect the hazard) measures the information favoring the alternative that taking the drug increases the hazard: Such an interpretation would have to assume that the 61% higher hazard seen with the drug is solely a product of genuine drug effects and random errors, which is not credible due to the possibility of systematic errors from failure of background assumptions (such as the assumption of no uncontrolled bias).
| COMPATIBILITY IS INTENTIONALLY LIMITED
One may object that, even unconditionally, compatibility interpretations will still be biased by assumption violations.
That objection is simply a failure to understand the meaning of "unconditional": Unconditionally, "high compatibil-
ity" merely says the chosen testing procedure did not detect an assumption violation; it makes no claim whatsoever that such violation or resulting bias is absent. It is thus a response to the maxim "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" [18] in the form of a retreat from any inference about why the data and the model appear as compatible or incompatible as they do.
In general, unconditional compatibility interpretations refuse to satisfy demands for conclusive assessments, Unfortunately, some assumptions (such as no unreported model selection [21, 22] ) will be untestable for the reader, while other assumptions will remain untestable (nonidentifiable) even if we are given the study data and full details on how it was collected. For example, the hypothesis that an observed association (or lack thereof) was due to confounding by an unmeasured variable cannot be tested without assumptions about the relation of that variable to those observed. Thus, if such a hypothesis is entertained seriously, an unconditional interpretation will avoid referring to the observed association as an "effect estimate" because the latter term invites conditioning on the assumption that the analysis successfully adjusted for all important confounding.
| UNCONDITIONAL INTERVAL ESTIMATES: COMPATIBILITY WITHOUT COVERAGE CLAIMS
A confidence interval (CI) is often defined as an interval that contains the true parameter value some percentage of the time (usually 95%) in some hypothetical "long run"
involving unlimited study repetitions, with only random errors causing interval variation across these repetitions.
Consequently, most descriptions write as if CIs are only defined or justified by their long-run coverage properties under the background assumptions [23] , without considering unconditional interpretations.
One objection often raised to coverage is the unreality of the very hypothetical repetitions in which said coverage is supposed to take place, a long run which is in fact not necessary under information interpretations [6, 24] . Our primary concern however is that when the assumptions (model) used to compute the interval cannot be assured, neither can coverage, and the resulting confidence interval becomes an overconfidence interval [6, 16] . The coverage interpretation conveys valid information only when we know the assumption violations would not reduce coverage; otherwise, in the face of assumption uncertainty, coverage becomes an irrelevant conditional interpretation [3, 6, 16, 25] . We thus argue that teaching and practice should de-emphasize long-run coverage in favor of more descriptive, purely logical properties of the intervals as provided by unconditional interpretations.
Specifically, we can bypass the need for a coverage bits [6, 16] . Thus, conditional on the background assumptions, the CI contains a range of parameter values that are more compatible with the data than values outside the interval [6, 13] . Unconditionally, and regardless of long-run coverage, the interval shows the values of the parameter which, when combined with the background assumptions, produce a test model that is "highly compatible" with the data in the sense of having less than 4.32 bits of information against the resulting test model. We thus refer to CI as compatibility intervals rather than confidence intervals [6, 16] ; their abbreviation remains "CI. "
A CI shows the conditional compatibility between the data and various target-parameter values, given the background model assumptions; but it also shows unconditional compatibility between the data and a family of models identical apart from a varying target parameter [6, 16] . The unconditional-compatibility interpretation is important whenever background assumptions are uncertain, for then coverage becomes uncertain. In that case we can say that the interval describes a family of models defined by varying the parameter or hypothesis, plus the fixed set of background assumptions. These models differ only in the value they assign to the parameter targeted in the hypothesis H;
they share the property the data provide "little" information against them (less than 4.32 bits for 95% intervals).
Another attempt at expressing caution due to uncertain assumptions is to describe CIs as only gauging the amount of random error in the results [27] . For example, a randomized trial that produces a CI for a hazard ratio ranging from 0.90 (a 10% rate decrease) and as high as 20 (a 20-fold rate increase) is taken to indicate that the results are too noisy to pin down even the direction of the association. This view leads to use of interval estimates to plan studies for precision based on desired interval width [28, 29] (rather than statistical power, where one fixates on rejecting or failing to reject the test hypothesis). From the compatibility view, the goal is now to ensure that the region of compatibility above a given level is narrow enough to make the study reasonably informative under the background assumptions. That goal does not however address violation of those assumptions, which can drastically reduce the informativeness of the study; it can also bias estimates of random variation [3] . Thus the "random error only" interpretation of CIs is not an effective substitute for the unconditional interpretation.
| WHAT ABOUT THE NEED FOR DECISIONS?
We have been concerned only with how to validly describe statistical summaries. Decisions based on those summaries are often needed, but statistical decision theory [30] is a massive, deep topic beyond our current scope.
A key point is that, when background assumptions are uncertain, neither conditional nor unconditional summarizations suffice for statistical decision methods: Those methods require some type of utility measure or loss function, along with prior distributions (whether empirical or subjective) that incorporate all the important uncertainties in the application. The conventional dichotomous decision framework (rejecting or accepting hypotheses based on whether a P-value passes some cutoff or an interval includes a parameter value) is based entirely on the conditional interpretation; whenever that involves assuming as if known things that are unknown, it fails the requirement for uncertainty accounting. The persistence of the conventional framework despite such deficiencies reflects the complexity of better methods and lack of agreement about simple replacements; but again, this is a huge topic beyond our current scope.
| CONCLUSION
Treating formal statistics as if they capture all important uncertainty sources has been labeled uncertainty laundering [31] , which is exactly what is done whenever discussions revolve around whether results are "statistically significant" or whether interval estimates contain a null value.
Even when this is not done, expressions of uncertainty about analysis assumptions is usually reserved for informal discussion, which often seems to be "walking back" conditional descriptions from the results section.
In contrast, unconditional descriptions introduce assumption uncertainty directly into statistical presenta-tions of results, recognizing that those results cannot claim to have captured uncertainty if there are plausible doubts about the assumptions or models used to derive the statistics. We thus view unconditional description as a vital component of good statistical training and presentation, one that should be at the forefront of the statistical reform movement.
